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1 
ARTICLES 
THE LONG-ARM’S INAPPROPRIATE 
EMBRACE 
LYNDA WRAY BLACK† 
“I’ve got the drinkers and the smokers and the eaters on my side.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Forty miles south of downtown Memphis lies the gambling 
town of Tunica, Mississippi.  Not dissimilar from other gambling 
venues, visitors pack the poker tables and fill the concert halls. 
Alcohol and money flow freely.  Smoke wafts and permeates the 
senses.  Liaisons consummate.  Addictions are indulged.  But 
underneath the frivolity in Tunica’s gambling halls lurks an 
antiquated morality tort that might have a visitor to Tunica 
losing more than a poker hand. 
I. THE PLAYERS: GOLFER AND GIRLFRIEND
A. Meet John Daly
Professional athletes live their successes and failures in an
increasingly public arena.2  The championship victories as well as 
†  Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Memphis, Cecil C. Humphreys 
School of Law; J.D. Yale Law School (1989). I thank my colleague Katharine Traylor 
Schaffzin for her valuable comments. I also wish to thank the faculty at SULC for 
providing me the opportunity to present this article at the Law Center. Finally, I 
thank the research assistants who aided me on this project: Sheerin Mehdian, 
Brittany Roberts, and Chelsea Kiss. 
1  John Daly Quotes, AZQUOTES, www.azquotes.com/quote/555390 (last visited 
June 25, 2017). 
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the personal tragedies are front page news.3  The achievements 
and struggles of American professional golfer John Daly are no 
exception.4  Arguably, the achievements make him a legend, and 
the struggles make him real.5  Daly was raised in Arkansas, 
taught himself to play golf using golf balls he recovered from a 
pond,6 joined the PGA TOUR in 1991 and that same year was 
named PGA TOUR Rookie of the Year.7  By the age of thirty, 
Daly had achieved two major championship titles;8 he boasts a 
total of five career PGA TOUR victories.9  Despite all of his 
talent, Daly remains the only eligible two-time major winner 
never to be chosen to play in the prestigious Ryder Cup.10  
Perhaps his antics on and off the greens are to blame.11  In his 
personal life, Daly has been married and divorced four times and 
has fathered three children, one each with wives two, three and 
four.12  Daly is on the verge of marriage number five.  He and his 
2 See, e.g., Jimmy Sanderson, Professional Athletes’ Shrinking Privacy 
Boundaries: Fans, Information and Communication Technologies, and Athlete 
Monitoring, 2 INT’L J. SPORT COMM. 240, 241 (2009). 
3 See, e.g., George Diaz, Privacy Is a Game Pro Athletes Have Lost, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL, (Nov. 17, 1996), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/1996-11-17/news/96 
11160878_1_blotter-nick-anderson-athletes (“Their lives are full of confusing 
contradictions, reflecting society’s curious demands.”). 
4 See Doug Ferguson, John Daly Suspended for 6 Months by PGA Tour, GOLF, 
http://www.golf.com/ap-news/john-daly-suspended-6-months-pga-tour (last visited 
June 25, 2017). 
5 See John Daly, JOCKBIO.COM: MY SAY, http://www.jockbio.com/Bios/Daly/Daly 
_mysay.html (last visited June 25, 2017) (“Everybody goes through divorces. There’s 
millions of people that have drinking problems. There’s people that their weight goes 
up and down, just like mine. It’s just life. And I think people relate to that. I really 
do.”). 
6 See Kelly Phillips Erb, John Daly Relied on Tax Records to Figure $90 Million 
Gambling Losses, FORBES (June 2, 2014, 2:45 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kelly 
phillipserb/2014/06/02/john-daly-relied-on-tax-records-to-figure-90-million-gambling-
losses/#5947951e49bc. 
7 See Bio, JOHNDALY.COM, http://johndaly.com/bio/ (last visited June 25, 2017). 
8 See id. 
9 John Daly won the 2004 Buick Invitational, the 1995 Open Championship, the 
1994 BellSouth Classic, the 1992 B.C. Open, and the 1991 PGA Championship. John 
Daly Player Profile, PGA TOUR, http://www.pgatour.com/players/player.01249.john-
daly.html/profile (last visited June 25, 2017). 
10 See supra note 7. 
11 See generally JOHN DALY WITH GLEN WAGGONER, MY LIFE IN AND OUT OF THE 
ROUGH: THE TRUTH BEHIND ALL THAT BULL**** YOU THINK YOU KNOW ABOUT ME 
(2007). 
12 See Christina Patracuolla, Anna Cladakis, John Daly’s Fiancée: 5 Fast Facts 
You Need to Know, HEAVY (July 17, 2015, 2:12 PM), http://heavy.com/sports/2015 
/07/anna-cladakis-john-dalys-fiancee-ex-wife-divorce-suing-affair-married-girlfriend 
(last updated July 8, 2016). 
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girlfriend, Anna Cladakis, became engaged in December 2014.13  
Daly, now with Cladakis by his side as caddie and fashion 
double,14 continues to live large.15  As the hallmarks of Tunica, 
Mississippi—eating, drinking, smoking and gambling—are also 
self-proclaimed hallmarks of Daly.16  One would not be surprised 
to learn that he has, on occasion, visited Tunica, Mississippi for 
recreation.  The casual intersection of John Daly, his girfriend 
and Tunica provides a litigious lens through which the exercise of 
long-arm jurisdiction by one state over residents of another state 
must be examined.17 
B. Romance on the Road
Despite an estimated $90 million in gambling losses between
1991 and 2007,18 John Daly owns an impressive tour bus.19  Daly 
considers his Prevost RV to be his “home away from home.”20  
These days one might find him in Augusta, Georgia, not on the 
golf course as in his glory days, but rather, hawking his 
merchandise from his tour bus parked in front of the Augusta 
Hooters.21  Allegedly, such a tour bus provided the situs in 2007 
13 See Micah Peters, John Daly Got Engaged to His Girlfriend of Seven Years, 
USA TODAY: FTW GOLF (Dec. 5, 2014, 5:14 PM), http://ftw.usatoday.com/2014/12/ 
john-daly-engaged-girlfriend-seven-years. 
14 Daly has an endorsement contract with Loudmouth Golf whose bold and 
garish clothing line has “proven to be a perfect fit for John Daly—and girlfriend 
Anna Cladakis.” “Bad Golf Style” Lives with Loudmouth, Daly, PGA TOUR: FASHION 
INSIDER (Oct. 27, 2010), www.pgatour.com/news/2010/10/27/fashion-insider.html. 
15 Luke Kerr-Dineen, Breaking: John Daly Is on Snapchat (Mar. 23, 2016, 11:12 
AM), http://ftw.usatoday.com/2016/03/john-daly-is-on-snapchat-brace-yours 
elves-people (“John Daly announced that he is . . . letting us take a glimpse of his 
crazy-pants wearing, chain-smoking, Hooters food-eating, diet coke-drinking, club-
throwing, Donald Trump-supporting, ‘wild thing’ lifestyle.”). 
16 John Daly, supra note 5 (“Everyone has addictions and my problem is that I 
have 5,000 of them. If it’s not drinking, it’s gambling; if it’s not gambling, it’s eating 
anything from burgers, doughnuts to M&Ms. The only addiction I don’t suffer from 
is chasing women.”). 
17 Long-arm jurisdiction is achieved through a state’s long-arm statute which is 
defined by Black’s Law Dictionary to be “[a] statute providing for jurisdiction over a 
nonresident defendant who has had contacts with the territory where the statute is 
in effect. Most state long-arm statutes extend this jurisdiction to its constitutional 
limits.” Long-Arm Statute, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
18 Phillips Erb, supra note 6. 
19 See Take a Look Inside John Daly's RV Parked in Front of the Augusta 
Hooters, GOLF, http://www.golf.com/video/tour-john-dalys-rv-parked-outside-augusta 
-hooters (last visited June 25, 2017).
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
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and 2008 for Daly and girlfriend Anna Cladakis to engage in the 
type of behavior in which professional athletes and the beautiful 
women surrounding them often engage.22 
Imagine a 39-year-old Cladakis employed as a promotional 
director for Hooters meeting John Daly through his endorsement 
contract with Hooters.23  Imagine further that in 2007 Cladakis 
travels from her home state of Florida to Memphis, Tennessee for 
a social visit with Daly.24  While in Memphis, the separated but 
still legally married Daly and Cladakis hop onto Daly’s tour bus 
for a short drive.25 
Memphis is situated in the southwest corner of Tennessee.26  
Daly could have driven the tour bus 30 minutes east or north and 
remained within the state of Tennessee.  Alternatively, Daly 
could have driven 30 minutes west of Memphis to the state of 
Arkansas.  Within either Tennessee or Arkansas, Cladakis’s 
alleged tour bus tryst with a married man would not have given 
rise to a cause of action in tort.27  However, Daly drove 30 
minutes south to the gambling and entertainment town of 
Tunica, Mississippi.  Travel in this direction—and only in this 
direction—opened the door to a lawsuit by Daly’s then wife 
against Daly’s companion on the tour bus.28  Notwithstanding the 
22 Miller v. Provident Adver. & Mktg., Inc., 155 So. 3d 181, 188 n.4 (Miss. Ct. 
App. 2014), cert denied, 135 S. Ct. 2862 (2015). Ironically, Daly’s tour bus is not the 
first RV to feature prominently in heart balm litigation. In 1997, Suzanne Barkes 
sued her former fiancé Dr. Alvin D. Gilbert for breach of promise to marry after his 
former lover showed up at the motor home in which Barkes and Gilbert were 
vacationing. Gilbert v. Barkes, 987 S.W.2d 772 (Ky. 1999); see also Jane Van Ryan, 
Hazen v. Scharringhaus and Barkes v. Gilbert, MABRY–HAZEN HOUSE (Jan. 4, 2016), 
http://www.mabryhazen.com/news/2016/1/4/hazen-v-scharringhaus-and-barkes-v-
gilbert. 
23 Peters, supra note 13. 
24 Miller, 155 So. 3d at 185. 
25 THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, John Daly Love Triangle May Be Headed to Supreme 
Court, N.Y. POST (May 12, 2015, 11:03 AM), http://nypost.com/2015/05/12/john 
-daly-love-triangle-may-be-headed-to-supreme-court/.
26 Where Is Memphis, Tennessee?, WORLDATLAS, http://www.worldatlas.com/na/ 
us/tn/where-is-memphis.html (last visited June 25, 2017). 
27 As of 2007, neither Tennessee nor Arkansas recognized the torts of alienation 
of affections or criminal conversation, Tennessee having abolished them in 1989 and 
1991, respectively, and Arkansas having abolished them in 1989. See infra note 35. 
See also infra Part III for a discussion of these torts. 
28 Mississippi is one of only a handful of states which provides legal recourse to 
a brokenhearted plaintiff whose spouse’s affections have been alienated by the 
wrongful acts of another. See Sheri Stritof, Alienation of Affection State Laws, 
ABOUT: MARRIAGE (Dec. 25, 2015), http://marriage.about.com/od/legalities/a/ 
alienation.htm. 
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insignificant amount of time and money Cladakis spent in the 
state of Mississippi, her lack of assets, and business interests in 
the state,29 her crossing across the state line into the 
jurisdictional reach of Mississippi’s long-arm statute set the 
stage for Part II: Mississippi Provides a Remedy.30 
II. MISSISSIPPI PROVIDES A REMEDY
On February 19, 2010, the almost nine-year marriage of 
Sherrie Miller and John Daly ended with a Tennessee divorce.31  
Consistent with Tennessee law, the divorce court presumably32 
distributed marital property equitably,33 made provisions for the 
child of the marriage,34 and severed the parties’ legal status as 
husband and wife.  The Tennessee court was, however, impotent 
to offer additional financial salve for Sherrie Miller’s wounded 
heart, as the public policy of Tennessee no longer embraced the 
amatory torts35 of alienation of affections36 and criminal 
29 The amount of time and money spent within a state, as well as property 
owned or business ventures conducted within a state, are factors supporting whether 
an individual has purposefully established minimum contacts with a state necessary 
for the state to exercise personal jurisdiction over the individual without offending 
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945). 
30 See infra note 42. 
31 This was Daly’s fourth divorce. See Patracuolla, supra note 12. 
32 Terms of the divorce are not publicly available as the case is under seal. 
33 Tennessee is an equitable division state. Fault is not a factor in the equitable 
division of property. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-121 (West, Westlaw through 2017 
1st Reg. Sess.). Some practitioners, however, contend that marital fault such as 
adultery may indirectly affect the judge’s discretion to award more property to the 
innocent spouse. See Grounds for Divorce in Tennessee FAQ’s, MILES MASON LAW 
FIRM, http://memphisdivorce.com/grounds-for-divorce-in-tennessee-faqs/ (last visited 
June 25, 2017). 
34 The Tennessee Child Support Guidelines are found at TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-
5-101. Miller and Daly have one son together. Patracuolla, supra note 12.
35 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-701 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st Reg. Sess.)
(legislatively abolishing alienation of affections in Tennessee); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 39-13-508 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st Reg. Sess.) (legislatively abolishing
criminal conversation).
36 David M. Cotter, The Well-Deserved Erosion of the Tort of Alienation of 
Affections and the Potential Liability of Nonresident Defendants, 15 No. 12 DIVORCE 
LITIG. 204 (2003) (“The essential elements of alienation of affections are as follows: 
(1) The existence of a valid marriage at the time the alienation occurred;
(2) Wrongful conduct on the part of the defendant; (3) An injury to the innocent
spouse demonstrated by the loss of affection or consortium; and (4) A causal
connection between the defendant’s conduct and the innocent spouse’s loss.”).
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conversation.37  In 1991, the Tennessee Supreme Court declared 
that such amatory torts “ha[d] no place in contemporary society, 
because the social harm [caused] far outweighs any justification 
for [their] existence . . . .”38  Dissatisfied with the public policy of 
her home state, Miller filed a complaint for alienation of affection 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Anna 
Cladakis in the DeSoto County Mississippi Circuit Court.39  
Miller filed her complaint on February 25, 2011, a full year after 
Miller’s divorce from Daly, alleging that Cladakis’s wrongful and 
inappropriate contact with Daly caused the breakdown of Miller’s 
marriage to Daly which, in turn, caused Miller to suffer loss of 
society, companionship with Daly, and loss of sexual relations.40  
The enumerated acts of Cladakis’s wrongful conduct comprise 
cell phone calls and text messages to Daly and two dates on 
which Cladakis and Daly allegedly engaged in sexual conduct 
while on Daly’s tour bus parked in Mississippi.41  The hook on 
which Miller relied to establish a claim of alienation of affections 
under Mississippi law was the reach of the Mississippi long-arm 
statute, which provides as follows: 
Any nonresident person, firm, general or limited partnership, or 
any foreign or other corporation not qualified under the 
Constitution and laws of this state as to doing business herein, 
who shall make a contract with a resident of this state to be 
performed in whole or in part by any party in this state, or who 
shall commit a tort in whole or in part in this state against a 
resident or nonresident of this state, or who shall do any 
business or perform any character of work or service in this 
state, shall by such act or acts be deemed to be doing business 
in Mississippi and shall thereby be subjected to the jurisdiction  
37 Shauna M. Deans, Comment: The Forgotten Side of the Battlefield in 
America’s War on Infidelity: A Call for the Revamping, Reviving, and Reworking of 
Criminal Conversation and Alienation of Affections, 53 HOW. L.J. 377, 393 (2010) 
(“The elements of criminal conversation, despite slight variance among different 
jurisdictions and time periods, generally included: (1) proof of a valid marriage; (2) a 
third party’s adulterous intercourse with the plaintiff’s spouse; and (3) damages.”). 
38 Hanover v. Ruch, 809 S.W.2d 893, 894 (Tenn. 1991). 
39 Miller v. Provident Advert. & Mktg. Inc., 155 So. 3d 181, 185 (Miss Ct. App. 
2014). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 188 n.4; see also id. at 186–87 (noting that “[o]n February 27, 2012, 
Miller moved to file a second amended complaint, which would have given two 
specific dates [of January 1, 2007, and April 13, 2008] of the alleged sexual and/or 
improper conduct . . . .”). 
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of the courts of this state.  Service of summons and process upon 
the defendant shall be had or made as is provided by the 
Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure.42 
Though the trial court of Mississippi dismissed Miller’s claim 
for lack of personal jurisdiction over nonresident Cladakis,43 the 
Mississippi Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Miller had 
established a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction pursuant 
to the Mississippi long-arm statute44 by alleging that Cladakis 
had committed a tort “in whole or in part in 
[Mississippi] . . . against a . . . nonresident of this 
state . . . [which] subjected [Cladakis] to the jurisdiction of the 
courts of this state.”45  Having established personal jurisdiction 
in a state recognizing as tortious the alienation by another of 
one’s spouse’s affections,46 Miller was situated to proceed to trial 
seeking money damages against Cladakis under Mississippi 
law.47  Through application of the tort prong of the Mississippi 
long-arm statute,48 “a Tennessee resident took advantage of 
Mississippi’s long-arm statute to sue a Florida resident for 
alienation of affection—a cause of action not recognized in 
Tennessee.”49  It is interesting to note that both alienation of 
affections and criminal conversation were recognized in 
Mississippi until 199250 at which time criminal conversation—
which allowed a plaintiff to recover in tort against a third party 
for adultery with plaintiff’s spouse—was jettisoned by 
42 MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-3-57 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.) 
(emphasis added). 
43 Miller, 155 So. 3d at 187. 
44 Id. at 191. 
45 See MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-3-57 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.). 
46 Alienation of affections is recognized in Mississippi as a valid cause of action 
against a paramour to remedy intentional conduct that causes a spouse to suffer loss 
and injury to her marital relationship. Fitch v. Valentine, 959 So. 2d 1012, 1020 
(Miss. 2007), reh’g denied, July 26, 2007. 
47 In an action for alienation of affections, jury awards of punitive and actual 
damages may be substantial. See, e.g., id. at 1030 (upholding a punitive damages 
award for $112,500 and actual damages award of $642,000). 
48 See MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-3-57 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.). 
49 The terminology employed by Judge Maxwell in Waldrup v. Eads, 180 So. 3d 
820, 829 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (emphasis added), is both noteworthy and accurate. 
Barred from suing in Tennessee, Miller opportunistically filed suit in Mississippi 
just prior to the running of the three statute of limitations imposed by MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 15-1-49 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.). 
50 David Neil McCarty, Love in Vain: The Social Value of Mississippi’s 
Alienation of Affection in Protecting Marriage, 31 MISS. C. L. REV. 107, 111 (2012). 
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Mississippi51 consistent with the national trend of states’ 
disfavoring the heart balm torts.52  Once criminal conversation 
was abolished, Mississippi was “left with one arrow in its quiver 
to protect marriage: alienation of affection.”53  Mississippi 
continues to vehemently adhere to this morality tort as necessary 
protection of the values which underscore marriage.54  Even as 
other states reject the antiquated and ineffective “arrows” of the 
amatory torts, Mississippi is sharpening its arrow, and providing 
a shooting range for brokenhearted residents and nonresidents 
alike.55 
III. HISTORY OF HEART BALM
In order to understand Mississippi’s judicial devotion to—
and interstate peddling of—the tort of alienation of affections, 
one must examine the ebb and flow of the popularity of the heart 
balm56 torts and their perceived necessity57—or utter 
worthlessness58—for vindicating a broken heart.59  At common 
law, a man’s legal remedies were embodied in two distinct torts: 
alienation of affections and criminal conversation, both offering 
redress against the third-party male interloper on the marriage 
51 Saunders v. Alford, 607 So. 2d 1214, 1214 (Miss. 1992) (holding that the tort 
of criminal conversation was no longer a viable tort in Mississippi). 
52 See infra Section III.B. 
53 McCarty, supra note 50, at 111. 
54 Jamie Heard, Comment, The National Trend of Abolishing Actions for the 
Alienation of a Spouse’s Affection and Mississippi’s Refusal to Follow Suit, 28 MISS. 
C. L. REV. 313, 331 (2009) (“Refusing to abolish the tort, the court stated that it
‘believe[s] that the marital relationship is an important element in the foundation of
out [sic] society [and t]o abolish the tort of alienation of affection would, in essence,
send the message that [the court is] devaluing the marriage relationship.’ ” (citing
Bland v. Hill, 735 So. 2d 414, 418 (Miss. 1999))).
55 The Mississippi Court of Appeals noted that Miller “lack[ed] a viable 
alternative forum to adjudicate [her] claim, since both Tennessee and Florida have 
abolished alienation-of-affection as a cause of action. This fact increases 
Mississippi’s interest in adjudicating this claim.” Miller, 155 So. 3d at 194. 
56 Heart balm is a euphemistic label conveying, perhaps derisively, that the 
money judgment award in tort will serve as salve for the broken hearted plaintiff. 
57 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 629 (1st ed. 1956) (“Particularly in 
alienation, grievous wrongs are suffered and some of life’s most important interests 
ruthlessly invaded. To abolish all remedy in such cases is certainly subject to serious 
questions.”). 
58 Deana Pollard Sacks, Intentional Sex Torts, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1051, 1055 
(2008) (claiming that “contemporary jurisprudence reflects the view that a broken 
heart is not actionable . . . .”). 
59 See BEVERLY, MELDRUM & BLACK, TENNESSEE DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW 
(forthcoming 2017), for a discussion of the history of heart balm torts. 
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relationship.60  Historically, these morality torts were not 
available to wives as men and women were not equal players 
under the law,61 and within domestic relations law, the pattern 
was clear:  Women were legally dependent appendages to their 
legally dominant male, whether father or husband.62  Consistent 
with the notion that women were appendages to their legally 
dominant male, the common law provided two remedies to the 
man, either the father or the spouse, whose woman, either wife 
or daughter, was compromised by the intentional, wrongful 
affections of a third party.63 
The specific elements establishing an action for alienation of 
affections may vary; however, in general, the plaintiff must show 
the existence of a marriage with love and affection between the 
plaintiff and his spouse, wrongful actions by another directed to 
the plaintiff’s spouse, and a causal link between those wrongful 
actions and a breakdown in the marriage.64  Alienation of 
affections has also carried the descriptive moniker “enticement”65 
and seeks to redress the various losses—financial and intimate—
suffered by a husband whose wife is enticed away from him by 
the wrongful (and often sexual) advances of another.66 
60 The heart balm torts of alienation of affections and criminal conversation 
evolved from the English common law actions for enticement and seduction, 
respectively. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
§ 124 (5th ed. 1984).
61 Sacks, supra note 58, at 1056 (noting that the heart balm torts “were
dismantled to a large degree in recognition of their propensity to perpetrate 
antifeminist sexual stereotypes, which may cause social harm per se.”). 
62 See Women and the Law, HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL: WOMEN, ENTERPRISE 
& SOCIETY, http://www.library.hbs.edu/hc/wes/collections/women_law (last visited 
June 25, 2017), (explaining that historic “marriage and property laws, or ‘coverture,’ 
stipulated that a married woman did not have a separate legal existence from her 
husband. A married woman . . . was a dependent, like an underage child or a slave, 
and could not own property in her own name or control her own earnings, except 
under very specific circumstances. When a husband died, his wife could not be the 
guardian to their under-age children.”); see also Sacks, supra note 58, at 1058 
(noting that seduction, the precursor to criminal conversation, remedied the 
economic harm to a woman’s father’s property interest in her and that enticement, 
the precursor to alienation of affections, redressed the economic harm of a husband). 
63 Donnell v. Donnell, 415 S.W.2d 127, 132 (Tenn. 1967). 
64 See Cotter, supra note 36. 
65 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 60, § 124. 
66 Proof of sexual contact between the defendant and the plaintiff’s wife is not 
required to establish the tort of alienation of affections. KEETON ET AL., supra note 
60, § 124 (“[I]t is not necessary to show adultery or that the plaintiff spouse has been 
deprived of any household services or has suffered any pecuniary loss.”). 
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Criminal conversation is similar to the tort of alienation of 
affections; however, it requires proof of actual adulterous contact 
between the suitor and the plaintiff’s spouse.67  Historically, 
criminal conversation compensates the plaintiff for the resulting 
devaluing of his wife at the hands or perhaps by the hands of the 
defendant.68  The moniker “criminal conversation” is reminiscent 
of chapter four of Genesis in which Adam “knew” Eve and she 
conceived a child.69  Both linguistic usages disguise the act: “sex 
plain and simple.”70 
The final heart balm tort, breach of promise to marry, began 
as “a popular means of soothing the sufferings of rejected love.”71  
The common law offered this remedy to the woman whose suitor 
breached the pillars of social propriety by failing to commit to 
her, resulting in the nonoccurrence of her desired marriage.  A 
woman’s economic opportunity cost of engagement or marriage to 
one man was the foreclosure of attaining wife status with any 
other.  Consequently, where the promise to marry was not 
fulfilled, the common law provided a paternalistic economic 
redress for the dashed hopes, tarnished reputation and decreased 
future economic prospects of the rejected woman.  The redress 
was in the nature of a breach of contract action against the 
fiancé.  While the breach of promise to marry cause of action 
remains in many states,72 the modern embodiments of this cause 
of action require an actual contract to marry either evidenced by 
a written promise or proven by the testimony of two disinterested 
witnesses,73 and may limit damages to actual damages proven.74 
67 See Deans, supra note 37, at 393. 
68 The euphemistically named tort was formerly known as seduction. See 
KEETON ET AL., supra note 60, § 124. 
69 Genesis 4:1 (King James). 
70 Joanna L. Grossman & Lawrence M. Friedman, The Legal Price of Adultery 
Goes Down: North Carolina and West Virginia Abandon Heartbalm Actions, 
VERDICT: LEGAL ANALYSIS & COMMENT. FROM JUSTIA (June 24, 2014), 
https://verdict.justia.com/2014/06/24/legal-price-adultery-goes/. 
71 See, e.g., Rivkin v. Postal, No. M1999-01947-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 1077952, 
at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2001) (quoting Homer H. Clark Jr., The Law of 
Domestic Relations in the United States § 1.1 (2d ed. 1987)). 
72 About half of the states recognize a limited right of action under the theory of 
breach of promise to marry. See Neil G. Williams, What To Do When There’s No “I 
Do”: A Model for Awarding Damages Under Promissory Estoppel, 70 WASH. L. REV. 
1019, 1020–21 (1995). 
73 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-401 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st Reg. 
Sess.). 
74 See, e.g., id. § 36-3-404 (Westlaw). 
2017] THE LONG-ARM’S INAPPROPRIATE EMBRACE 11 
With time, the heart balm torts were modernized to provide 
a gender-neutral remedy to either a man or a woman whose 
promised marriage was not solemnized or whose solemnized 
marriage was sacrificed to the affections of another.  As the heart 
balm torts comprise three distinct causes of action, a state may 
embrace them all, reject them all or find one or two to be 
consistent with the state’s public policy while rejecting the 
other(s).75  Tennessee still recognizes the tort of breach of 
promise to marry;76 the other amatory torts, however, have been 
scrutinized, criticized and abolished by the courts and lawmakers 
in Tennessee.77  While the salacious fact patterns underlying the 
amatory torts may present sympathetic would-be plaintiffs,78 the 
public policy repudiating recovery in tort for alienation of 
affections and criminal conversation is absent any ambiguity for 
Tennesseans and their marriages, as the following cases 
demonstrate.79 
A. Two Tennessee Tortfeasors
Loyalty is expected from one’s spouse and one’s business
partner; Walter A. Dupius was betrayed by both.  In 1986 Mr. 
Dupuis filed an action for alienation of affections against his 
close friend and business partner Charles Hand for engaging in a 
three-year affair with Mr. Dupuis’ wife,80 which affair resulted in 
both the demise of Mr. Dupuis’ marriage and his business 
75 Significantly more than the other amatory torts, the tort of breach of promise 
to marry has survived scrutiny and remained a cause of action in roughly half of the 
states as of 1995. See Williams, supra note 72, at 1020–21. 
76 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-401 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st Reg. Sess.). 
77 See id. § 36-3-701; id. § 39-13-508 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st Reg. 
Sess.). 
78 See, e.g., Heck v. Schupp, 68 N.E.2d 464, 465 (Ill. 1946) (compensating a 
husband whose wife participated in an illicit affair while her husband was 
hospitalized); Scharringhaus v. Hazen, 107 S.W.2d 329, 330 (Ky. 1937) 
(compensating a jilted socialite $80,000 for her fiancé’s failure to marry her after a 
15-year engagement); Archer v. Archer, 219 S.W.2d 919, 921 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1947)
(finding for the plaintiff, as defendant “did by feminine wiles and guile incite and
welcome the attentions of [plaintiff’s] husband”); see also Murphy v. Colson, 999
N.E.2d 372, 374 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (redressing a father of six whose wife ran off
with her cross fit trainer); Miss Hazen’s Courtship in Court, LAWSON MCGHEE
LIBRARY (Jan. 27, 2010), https://www.knoxlib.org/about/news-and-publications/pod
casts/historic-knoxville-news-podcast/miss-hazens-courtship-court.
79 See Hanover v. Ruch, 809 S.W.2d 893, 893 (Tenn. 1991); see also infra notes 
90–91. 
80 Dupuis v. Hand, 814 S.W.2d 340, 341 (Tenn. 1991). 
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ventures.81  Following a convoluted procedural history through 
the Court of Appeals, in 1991 the Supreme Court of Tennessee 
affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of 
the defendant, Mr. Hand, and judicially abolished the common 
law action for alienation of affections in Tennessee.82  The 
common law tort of alienation of affections had been abolished by 
the General Assembly of Tennessee as of July 1, 1989.83  
However, the court found that the Tennessee General Assembly 
lacked the authority to enact a law which retroactively changed 
Mr. Dupuis’ vested common law right in his previously filed 
alienation of affections case.84 
A second case decided by the Tennessee Supreme Court in 
1991 addressed alienation of affections, criminal conversation 
and medical malpractice when a prominent gynecologist in 
Memphis was sued by the husband of a patient.85  In 1983, Dr. 
Robert M. Ruch and his patient Sandra Hanover began a two 
year affair notwithstanding Mrs. Hanover’s then twenty-nine-
year marriage to Jerome Hanover.86  At trial, the jury found that 
Dr. Ruch had committed the tort of criminal conversation and 
awarded compensatory and punitive damages to Mr. Hanover in 
the amount of $125,000.87  On Dr. Ruch’s appeal, the Tennessee 
Court of Appeals recommended the abolishment of criminal 
conversation, but noted its lack of authority to do so.88  The 
Tennessee Supreme Court, however, relying on precedent 
establishing retroactive application of judicial changes to the 
common law, declared the tort of criminal conversation to be 
obsolete and abolished it under Tennessee law.89 
81 Dupuis v. Dupuis, 1988 WL 74620, at *1–2 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 20, 1988). 
82 Hand, 814 S.W.2d at 341. 
83 1989 Tenn. Pub. Acts 517. 
84 Hand, 814 S.W.2d at 343. 
85 Hanover v. Ruch, 809 S.W.2d 893, 893 (Tenn. 1991) (“The defendant, Robert 
M. Ruch, M.D., is a gynecologist. The plaintiff is Jerome Hanover, whose wife,
Sandra Hanover, was Dr. Ruch's patient.”). The affair between the doctor and Mrs.
Hanover lasted for two years, at which point Mr. Hanover sued his wife for a divorce
and filed a “civil complaint against Dr. Ruch, alleging three causes of action:
criminal conversation, alienation of affections, and medical malpractice.” Id.
86 Id. at 893. 
87 Id. The tort of alienation of affections had just been retroactively abolished in 
Hand, 814 S.W.2d at 341. 
88 Hanover, 809 S.W.2d at 893. 
89 Id. at 898. 
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The holdings in Dupuis and Hanover contain diatribes 
against the evils underscoring and the harms promulgated by the 
heart balm torts of alienation of affections and criminal 
conversation.90  Having abolished the torts both legislatively and 
judicially, the lawmakers and judges of Tennessee have clearly 
articulated the public policy of Tennessee against these 
antiquated amatory remedies.91 
B. The Nearly Universal Demise of Morality Torts: Antiquated
Paradigms and Outdated Actions92
Tennessee was neither the first nor the most recent
jurisdiction to recant on the desirability of the heart balm torts.93  
In fact, the amatory torts have “come and gone in most 
jurisdictions.”94  Beginning in the mid-1930s the legislatures of 
several states including Alabama,95 California,96 Colorado,97 
Illinois,98 Indiana,99 New Jersey,100 and New York101 targeted the 
common law torts of alienation of affections, criminal 
conversation, and breach of promise to marry.102  The sudden 
enactment by these various state legislatures of Heart Balm 
90 Alienation of affections “diminishes human dignity, demeans the participants, 
inflicts pain upon the innocent, and does not prevent human misconduct.” Id. 
(quoting Lentz v. Baker, 792 S.W.2d 71, 76 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989)). 
91 Id. (“[T]he public policy of the state, as expressed by the Legislature, is 
offended by criminal conversation actions . . . .”). 
92 “When the reason for a rule of law disappears, so to [sic] should the rule.” 
Helsel v. Noellsch, 107 S.W.3d 231, 233 (Mo. 2003) (first citing Thomas v. Siddiqui, 
869 S.W.2d 740, 741 (Mo. 1994) (en banc); and then citing State ex inf. Norman v. 
Ellis, 28 S.W.2d 363, 368 (Mo. 1930)). 
93 In 2009, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court disavowed the tort of alienation of 
affections. Matthew v. Herman, S. Ct. Civ. No. 2009-0074, 2012 WL 1965891, at *5 
(V.I. May 15, 2012). 
94 Marshall Davidson, Comment, Stealing Love in Tennessee: The Thief Goes 
Free, 56 TENN. L. REV. 629, 629 (1989). 
95 ALA. CODE § 6-5-331 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.). 
96 CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.5 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 9 of 2017 Reg. Sess.). 
97 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-202 (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of the 
71st Gen. Assemb.). 
98 See ch. 38 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 246.1, 246.2 (West 1943). The Illinois Heart 
Balm Act was found to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Illinois in Heck 
v. Schupp, 68 N.E.2d 464, 465–66 (Ill. 1946).
99 IND. CODE ANN. § 34-12-2-1 (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of the
120th Gen. Assemb.). 
100 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23-1 (LEXIS through 217th 2d Annual Sess.). 
101 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 80-a (McKinney 2016). 
102 N. P. Feinsinger, Current Legislation Affecting Breach of Promise to Marry, 
Alienation of Affections, and Related Actions, 10 WIS. L. REV. 417, 417 (1935). 
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Acts—perhaps better named Anti-Heart Balm Acts as they 
abolished the common law heart balm torts—evidenced “the 
wave of agitation” with the common law torts.103  The verbose 
verbiage104  of New York’s noteworthy legislation is illuminating:   
“The remedies heretofore provided by law for the enforcement of 
actions based upon alleged alienation of affections, criminal 
conversation, seduction and breach of contract to marry, having 
been subjected to grave abuses, causing extreme annoyance, 
embarrassment, humiliation and pecuniary damage to many 
persons wholly innocent and free of any wrongdoing, who were 
merely the victims of circumstances, and such remedies having 
been exercised by unscrupulous persons for their unjust 
enrichment, and such remedies having furnished vehicles for 
the commission or attempted commission of crime and in many 
cases having resulted in the perpetuation of frauds, it is hereby 
declared as the public policy of the state that the best interests 
of the people of the state will be served by the abolition of such 
remedies.”105 
While courts throughout the United States had until then 
almost uniformly embraced the desirability of the common law 
torts,106 the sweep of Heart Balm Acts through the state 
legislatures reflected a legislative perspective that “the courts 
were suffering from precedent paralysis, and were not awake to 
social realities.”107  The gradual acceptance of gender equality 
and sexual freedom fostered a gradual rejection of possessory 
descriptions of the relationship between lovers; consequently, the 
heart balm torts were seen by most states as the very antithesis 
of the modern public policy underlying the state’s domestic 
relations laws.108  The repudiation of the common law remedies 
represented a relaxing of the social rigidity of the concept and  
103 Frederick L. Kane, Heart Balm and Public Policy, 5 FORDHAM L. REV. 63, 63 
(1936). 
104 The redundancy in the phrase “verbose verbiage” is intentional as the author 
contends that neither verbosity nor verbiage standing alone is sufficient to capture 
New York State’s legislative pronouncement of the public policy of the state in N.Y. 
N.Y. CIV. PRAC. ACT § 61(a) (McKinney 2016). 
105 Id. 
106 Alaska never embraced the heart balm torts. Harris v. Dragseth, No. S–5502, 
1994 WL 16459435, at *3 (Alaska Oct. 5, 1994). 
107 Kane, supra note 103, at 70. 
108 Sacks, supra note 58, at 1060–61 (noting that the heart balm remedies were 
“antithetical to gender equality and women’s self–determination”). 
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function of the family as well as an embracing of “increased 
freedom of association between each spouse and the outside 
world.”109 
A second wave of legislative attack on the heart balm torts 
accompanied the rapid social change of the 1960’s.110  During the 
1980’s and 1990’s, disdain for the heart balm torts moved from 
the legislative assemblies to the courthouses.111  When the 
Supreme Court of Missouri abolished alienation of affections as 
recently as 2003, the court acknowledged the changed social 
parameters, paradigms and expectations within intimate 
relationships noting that such changes require modification to 
antiquated rules of law.112 
Whether the abuses of the heart balm torts were ubiquitous 
or merely the result of a few isolated but well publicized cases of 
infidelity is largely irrelevant.113  The fact remains that “the 
amatory torts [fell] victim to the legal equivalent of a ‘perfect 
storm.’ ”114  Widespread disapproval of the torts was penned by 
legislative bodies115 and judicial clerks alike,116 noting that 
modern public policy is offended by the tort of alienation of 
109 Kane, supra note 103, at 71–72 (citing Nathan P. Feinsinger, Legislative 
Attack on “Heart Balm,” 33 MICH. L. REV. 979, 1009 (1935)). 
110 The following states legislatively abolished the tort of alienation of affections 
during the 1960’s: Connecticut by CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572b (LEXIS through 
Pub. Acts 1–7 of the 2017 Reg. Sess.); Delaware, rejected in tort by DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 10, § 3924 (West, Westlaw through 81 Laws 2017, chs. 1–20); Michigan by MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2901 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess. of the 99th 
Leg.); Montana by MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-601 (LEXIS through 2017 Reg. Sess. of 
the 65th Leg.); West Virginia by W.VA. CODE § 56-3-2a (West, Westlaw through 2017 
Reg. Sess.). 
111 The following states abolished alienation of affections by judicial 
proclamation: Idaho by O’Neil v. Schuckardt, 733 P.2d 693, 698 (Idaho 1986); Iowa 
by Fundermann v. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790, 794 (Iowa 1981); Kentucky by Hoye 
v. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d 422, 423 (Ky. 1992); South Dakota by Hunt v. Hunt, 309
N.W.2d 818, 819 (S.D. 1981); Washington by Wyman v. Wallace, 615 P.2d 452, 455
(Wash. 1980).
112 Helsel v. Noellsch, 107 S.W.3d 231, 232 (Mo. 2003) (citing Thomas v. 
Siddiqui, 869 S.W.2d 740, 741 (Mo. 1994). 
113 See Harold V. Dixon, Penal Provisions of the New “Heart Balm” Legislation, 
10 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 236, 239 (1936) (noting that local media coverage of the Heart 
Balm Acts in the mid 1930’s focused on misuse of the morality torts). 
114 Kyle Graham, Why Torts Die, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 359, 362–63 (2008). 
115 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 553.01 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess. 
and 1st Spec. Sess.). 
116 See, e.g., Wyman v. Wallace, 549 P.2d 71, 74 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976), aff’d 615 
P.2d 452 (1980) (stating that an action for alienation of affections “diminishes
human dignity”).
16 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:1  
affections.117  Most legislative repudiations of the heart balm 
torts were accompanied by vitriolic proclamations of that state’s 
public policy.118  The death of the heart balm torts in some states, 
by contrast, came quietly, as the state had made little or no use 
of the common law causes of action.119 
By 2000, all but seven states had repudiated the legal and 
social foundations underpinning the tort of alienation of 
affections.120  Even within those seven states, the decline of the 
heart balm torts can be seen in the paucity of cases,121 the 
lukewarm122 or even negative dicta of state courts,123 and state 
117 See, e.g., Young v. Young, 184 So. 187, 190 (Ala. 1938); Rotwein v. Gersten, 
36 So.2d 419, 420 (Fla. 1948); Quinn v. Walsh, 732 N.E.2d 330, 336 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2000); Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 395 A.2d 913, 918 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978). 
118 See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. 
Sess.) (abolishing the tort of alienation of affection) (“[T]he enforcement of the action 
for alienation of affections has been subjected to grave abuses and has been used as 
an instrument for blackmail by unscrupulous persons for their unjust enrichment, 
due to the indefiniteness of the damages recoverable in such actions . . . . It is also 
hereby declared that the award of monetary damages in such actions is ineffective as 
a recompense for genuine mental or emotional distress.”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 553.01 
(West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess. and 1st Spec. Sess.) (“[A]ctions based upon 
alleged alienation of affections, criminal conversation, seduction and breach of 
contract to marry, have been subject to grave abuses, have caused intimidation and 
harassment, to innocent persons and have resulted in the perpetration of frauds. It 
is declared as the public policy of the state that the best interests of the people of the 
state will be served by the abolition of these causes of action.”). 
119 There are only two reported cases of alienation of affections in New 
Hampshire, one in 1970 in which a husband sued his wife’s lover whose name, 
ironically, was Romeo. See Dube v. Rochette, 262 A.2d 288, 289 (N.H. 1970); see also 
Duval v. Wiggin, 474 A.2d 1002, 1005 (N.H. 1984). Alienation of affections was 
abolished by the New Hampshire legislature in 1981. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 460:2 
(West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.). 
120 In 2016, alienation of affections is a recognized tort in only six states: 
Hawaii, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Dakota and Utah. Having 
legislatively repealed alienation of affections in 1935 with passage of the Heart Balm 
Act, the Supreme Court of Illinois reinstated the tort in 1946 in Heck v. Schupp, 68 
N.E.2d 464 (Ill. 1946), but the legislature later repealed it again on January 1, 2016. 
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/7.1 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.). In that 
case, Mr. Heck claimed that before he joined the army, he and his wife, Henrietta, 
enjoyed a happy, loving marriage. Heck, 68 N.E.2d at 465. Mr. Heck sued 
Henrietta’s lover, Mr. Schupp, for the tort of alienation of affections after Mr. 
Schupp “wantonly and maliciously destroyed and alienated . . . the affection of the 
said Henrietta” while Mr. Heck was deployed. Id. 
121 The only reported case of alienation of affections in Hawaii is Waki v. 
Yamada, 26 Haw. 52, 53 (Haw. 1921) in which the Supreme Court of Hawaii upheld 
the dismissal of an action for enticement, the legal precursor to alienation of 
affections. See Hunt v. Chang, 594 P.2d 118, 123 (Haw. 1979). 
122 While alienation of affections remains a common law cause of action in New 
Mexico, the Court of Appeals has expressed its disfavor of the tort in Padwa v. 
2017] THE LONG-ARM’S INAPPROPRIATE EMBRACE 17 
statutes limiting alienation of affections to a mere shadow of its 
former common law embodiment.124  In some states alienation of 
affection has survived direct appeals to abolish the tort by a 
minority of the state’s Supreme Court judges.125 
The rejection of the heart balm tort of alienation of affections 
by the vast majority of states represents a paradigm shift in 
family law.  Only two states, Mississippi126 and North Carolina,127 
have refused to “[t]hrow out these claims into the ashbin of 
history” and instead continue to enthusiastically entertain 
modern actions for the wounded of heart.128  Recent judicial 
opinions from each of Mississippi129 and North Carolina,130 
however, might foreshadow a reeling in of the availability of 
alienation of affections as a tort remedy against nonresident 
defendants. 
Hadley, 981 P.2d 1234, 1240 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999). Noting that the Supreme Court of 
South Dakota was not a “legislative overlord,” that court deferred to the state’s 
statutorily based tort of alienation of affections in affirming a $265,000 jury award 
to a husband whose wife had engaged in sexual relations with her supervisor. See 
Veeder v. Kennedy, 589 N.W.2d 610, 616 (S.D. 1999). 
123 See Coulter v. Renshaw, 418 N.E.2d 489, 490 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (“Not only 
have alienation of affection actions been limited sharply by statute in Illinois, they 
also have been subject to close and strict judicial scrutiny within very narrow limits 
both in pleading and proof.”); see also Feldman v. Feldman, 480 A.2d 34, 34 (N.H. 
1984). 
124 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 460:2 provides, “No damages shall be allowed to 
either spouse in any action based on alienation of the affections of the other spouse.” 
This statute effectively abolished alienation of affections in New Hampshire. 
Damages for alienation of affections actions in Illinois are statutorily limited to 
actual damages per ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 1901–07 (repealed 2016). Causes of 
action brought before the repeal may still stand as valid. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/7.1 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.). 
125 See, e.g., Veeder, 589 N.W.2d at 616 (S.D. 1999) (holding that public policy 
does not require the abolition of the statutorily-derived tort of alienation of 
affections); see also Michele Crissman, Note, Alienation of Affections: An Ancient 
Tort—But Still Alive in South Dakota, 48 S.D. L. REV. 518, 537–38 (2003). 
126 Miller v. Provident Advert. and Mktg., 155 So. 3d 181, 185 (Miss. Ct. App. 
2014). 
127 See generally, Jean M. Cary & Sharon Scudder, Breaking Up is Hard To Do: 
North Carolina Refuses to End its Relationship with Heart Balm Torts, 4 ELON L. 
REV. 1, 2 (2012). 
128 Grossman & Friedman, supra note 70. 
129 Nordness v. Faucheux, 170 So. 3d 454, 456 (Miss. 2015). 
130 Rothrock v. Cooke, No. 14CVS870, 2014 WL 2973066, at *6 (N.C. Super. Ct. 
June 11, 2014). (holding North Carolina’s action for alienation of affections to be 
unconstitutional as it “explicitly seeks to punish the expression of friendliness, 
affection or intimacy by consenting parties . . . .”). 
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IV. HEART BALM’S THREAT TO STATE SOVEREIGNTY
Residents of one state often interact with residents of sister 
states or with the sister state itself.  If, however, an individual is 
to become a defendant in a sister state, that state must establish 
personal jurisdiction over the individual.  A state’s exercise of 
jurisdiction over an out-of-state tortfeasor requires conduct by 
the defendant which links the defendant to that state.  In a torts 
action these links, called minimum contacts, focus upon the 
relationship between the defendant, the state and the elements 
of the underlying tort.131 
The forum state’s hook by which it pulls nonresidents into 
the embrace of its laws is the forum state’s long-arm statute.  An 
expansive long-arm statute might provide that the commission of 
all or part of a tort within the state is a sufficient link to the state 
to require a nonresident tortfeasor to defend a lawsuit within 
that state.132 
The commission of wrongful acts which alienate a married 
individual from his spouse fails to be a tort in most states.133  
However, if the wrongful acts occur within one of the few states 
still upholding the tort of alienation of affections,134 these tortious 
contacts within the state trigger the state’s jurisdiction over a 
nonresident tortfeasor.135  Undoubtedly, in self-preservation of its 
own public policy and protection against the infringement upon 
its residents’ rights, each state will seek to extend its long-arm 
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in tort actions brought 
by state residents.  However, in tort actions brought by a 
nonresident against another nonresident, the dual rationales of 
public policy preservation and vindication of residents’ rights are 
missing, making the broad exercise of long-arm jurisdiction 
131 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945). 
132 See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-3-57 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. 
Sess.) (emphasis added). 
133 See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/7.1 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. 
Sess.). 
134 See supra, note 120. 
135 David Neil McCarty, a Mississippi lawyer, foresaw this very problem:  
“Knight is a resounding statement of support for the tort of alienation of 
affection. Not only will the tort survive in Mississippi under this reasoning, 
but persons from other states and countries would be well-advised to use 
caution because the state has a unique interest in protecting the 
relationships of its citizens.”  
McCarty, supra note 50, at 117; see also Knight v. Woodfield, 50 So. 3d 995, 997 
(Miss. 2011). 
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constitutionally tenuous.  Importantly, due process demands that 
even when minimum contacts exist, a state’s exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant must not violate the 
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.136 
A. Mississippi’s Very Long-Arm and the Dilution of Minimum
Contacts
A basic tenet of state sovereignty demands that one state’s
recognition of a legal remedy and its provision of a forum to its 
residents to pursue such remedy is not dependent upon the 
inclination of sister states to do likewise.137  There is no 
mandatory uniformity from state to state within family law.138  
While there may have been substantial commonality of legal 
principles among the states under early family law 
jurisprudence,139 the evolution of legal norms has progressed at 
different rates from state to state.140  Meanwhile, some states 
136 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). 
137 Sovereignty, THE LEGAL DICTIONARY, http://legal-dictionary.thefreediction 
ary.com/sovereignty (last visited June 25, 2017) (“Sovereignty is the power of a state 
to do everything necessary to govern itself, such as making, executing and applying 
laws . . . .”). 
138 See infra Section V.B. (discussing Uniform Laws). 
139 For example, early divorces in the United States required a showing of fault. 
The earliest record of divorces in the United States come from the Colony of 
Massachusetts Bay, where a special tribunal was formed in 1629 to hear divorce 
matters. The grounds for divorce were fault-based: adultery, bigamy, desertion, and 
impotence. The History of Divorce Law in the USA, HISTORY COOPERATIVE: A SHORT 
HISTORY OF NEARLY EVERYTHING, http://historycooperative.org/the-history-of-
divorce-law-in-the-usa/ (last visited June 25, 2017). The first divorce in the United 
States was granted in Massachusetts Bay in 1639 to Mrs. James Luxford on the 
grounds of bigamy. 1 CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY OF DIVORCE: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 684 
(Robert E. Emery ed., 2013). 
140 California was the first state to introduce no fault divorce. On January 1, 
1970, California’s Family Law Act became effective. The Act listed two grounds for 
divorce: “[i]rreconcilable differences, which have caused the irremediable breakdown 
of the marriage” and incurable insanity. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 4506 (West, Westlaw 
through Ch. 9 of 2017 Reg. Sess.); see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 2310 (West, Westlaw 
through Ch. 9 of 2017 Reg. Sess.) (providing California’s modern rule for no fault 
divorce). “The basic . . . change [made by the Act was the] elimination of fault or 
guilt as grounds for granting or denying divorce . . . .” Cary v. Cary, 109 Cal. Rptr. 
862, 865 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973). The California legislature did away with the 
requirement of a showing of fault for a few reasons: it caused the parties to dig up 
old wounds that they otherwise may have forgiven or forgotten; the evidence of 
blame only served to show that the marital differences were insoluble; and it only 
exacerbated the negative effect divorce had on the parties’ children. See Assemb. 
Daily Journal, Cal. Legislature, 1969 Regular Sess. 8058 (Jan. 6, 1969). California 
courts recognized that the idea of no fault divorce was relatively unpopular “because 
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may cling to an archaic legal norm, refusing to adapt public 
policy even in the face of changing norms across the country.141  
Family law is a reflection of shared values within a particular 
jurisdiction.  Close scrutiny must be given to any state law that 
provides a forum to nonresidents to circumvent the law of their 
home state.142  Such state laws flirt with the due process rights of 
the nonresident defendant and disrespect the sovereignty and 
public policy of the defendant’s home state.  The Court of Appeals 
in Mississippi does precisely that by affirming the state’s 
personal jurisdiction over Floridian Anna Cladakis and by 
providing both a forum and a cause of action for Miller’s claim of 
damages for her broken Tennessee marriage to Daly.143 
it permits a spouse guilty of morally reprehensible conduct to take advantage of that 
conduct in terminating marriage against the wishes of an entirely unoffending 
spouse.” Walton v. Walton, 104 Cal. Rptr. 472, 481 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972). However, 
the court maintained that 
 “[w]hile this may be true and while such a result may be offensive to those 
steeped in the tradition of personal responsibility based upon fault, this 
contention presents no issue cognizable in the courts . . . It is not the 
province of the courts to inquire into the wisdom of legislative enactments.” 
Id. 
141 Only three states still require a showing of fault for a unilateral divorce: 
South Dakota, Mississippi, and Tennessee. The South Dakota legislature recently 
rejected House Bill 1221, which would have created unilateral no fault divorce in the 
state; South Dakota still requires a showing of fault to grant unilateral divorces. See 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-2 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess. and Spec.
Sess.); SD House Votes Down Unilateral No-Fault Divorce Proposal, KDLT NEWS
(Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.kdlt.com/2015/02/26/sd-house-votes-down-unilateral-no-
fault-divorce-proposal. Mississippi also requires a showing of fault for unilateral
divorces: “Divorce from the bonds of matrimony may be granted on the ground of
irreconcilable differences, but only upon the joint complaint of the husband and
wife,” or where the defendant has been given notice. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-2
(West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.). Finally, Tennessee also requires a
showing of fault for unilateral divorce, unless both parties agree to all terms. See
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-101 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st Reg. Sess.) (providing
the grounds for divorce); id. § 36-4-103(e) (Westlaw) (providing that a divorce may
not be granted on the grounds of irreconcilable differences unless both parties
agree).
142 Ironically, the legislators of Mississippi are adamant that Mississippi’s public 
policy regarding degrees of consanguinity in lawful marriage (the marrying of one’s 
first cousin, for example) not be circumvented by the public policy of other states. 
See MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-3 (West), Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.) (“Any 
attempt to evade Section 93-1-1 by marrying out of this state and returning to it 
shall be within the prohibitions of said section.”). 
143 Miller v. Provident Advert. and Mktg., Inc., 155 So. 3d 181, 191 (Miss. Ct. 
App. 2014). 
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1. Mississippi’s Application of its Long-Arm Statute is Facially
Unreasonable and Violative of State Sovereignty and Public
Policy
The Supreme Court requires that jurisdiction must be
reasonable to avoid offending “traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.”144  In determining whether the exercise of 
jurisdiction is reasonable, a court is to look at a multitude of 
factors, including: the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the 
dispute, the burden on the defendant, the availability of an 
alternative forum, and the shared interests of the several States 
in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.145  An 
analysis of these factors necessarily and unequivocally leads to 
the conclusion that Mississippi’s assertion of jurisdiction is 
patently unreasonable; it violates not only the Due Process 
Rights of the parties, but also the Fourteenth-Amendment-
ensured sovereignty of Tennessee. 
First, Mississippi lacks any real interest in adjudicating this 
dispute, apart from forcing its domestic relations law on the rest 
of the states.  This case involves a Tennessee marriage, a 
Tennessee divorce, and a couple domiciled in Tennessee.  The 
plaintiff is not a resident of Mississippi.  States have a “manifest 
interest in providing effective means of redress for [their] 
residents,”146 but this “legitimate interest[s] [is] considerably 
diminished” when the parties are not residents of the forum 
state.147 
Next, Mississippi argues that the burden on Cladakis of 
hearing the case in Mississippi is low:  “Cladakis availed herself 
of the ‘privilege of conducting activities’ with Daly in the state of 
Mississippi, we do not find it improper to bring her back into 
Mississippi to defend the alienation-of-affection case that arose 
out of those alleged activities.”148  This again misinterprets the 
alienation of affection claim.  The breakdown of the Dalys’ 
marriage did not occur in Mississippi, but rather Tennessee.  Ms. 
Cladakis is a Florida resident.  The burden on Cladakis to travel 
to Mississippi to defend this suit is high. 
144 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
145 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). 
146 McGee v. Int’l Life Ins., 355. U.S. 220, 223 (1957). 
147 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987). 
148 Miller, 155 So. 3d at 194. 
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Third, Mississippi argues that it has a strong interest in 
adjudicating the dispute because it offers the only forum for 
Miller to obtain a remedy:  “Miller lacks a viable alternative to 
adjudicate [the alienation of affection claim], since both 
Tennessee and Florida have abolished alienation-of-affection as a 
cause of action.  This fact increases Mississippi’s interest in 
adjudicating this claim.”149  This is a gross misapplication of the 
law.  There are two appropriate, alternative forums: Tennessee 
and Florida.  Tennessee has an interest in the Dalys’ marriage, 
divorce, and the remedies arising from their relationship. 
Florida has personal jurisdiction over Cladakis, as she is a 
resident of that state.  These interests are infinitely stronger 
than Mississippi’s.  Moreover, even though both states have 
abolished alienation of affection rules, Tennessee and Florida 
have choice-of-law rules.  If they felt that Mississippi’s interests 
were so critical, they could simply choose to apply the law of 
Mississippi.  Thus, Mississippi is not the only forum for this case. 
Mississippi’s actions further undercut the sovereignty of 
Tennessee and Florida vis-à-vis their residents. 
Fourth, Tennessee and Mississippi do not “share[] 
interest[s] . . . in furthering fundamental substantive social 
policies.”150  Tennessee and Florida have expressly rejected the 
alienation of affection tort on public policy grounds, so there is 
absolutely no shared interest in furthering the application of the 
statute.151  The statutory codes of Tennessee and Florida have 
removed from the courts of Tennessee and Florida, respectively, 
the power to compensate Miller for her broken heart.152  
Furthermore, states that have abolished alienation of affections 
are loathe to backdoor a heart balm claim through another cause 
149 Id. 
150 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292. 
151 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 771.01 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st Reg. Sess. of 
the 25th Leg.) (“The rights of action heretofore existing to recover sums of money as 
damage for the alienation of affections . . . [is] hereby abolished.”); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 36-3-701 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st Reg. Sess.) (“The common law tort
action of alienation of affection is hereby abolished”).
152 See Rothrock v. Cooke, No. 14CVS870, 2014 WL 2973066 at *1 (N.C. Super. 
Ct. June 11, 2014) (Judge J. O. Craig III sidestepped the public policy arguments for 
abolishing alienation of affection and criminal conversation in North Carolina by 
noting that the “North Carolina Supreme Court . . . has unequivocally held that 
changes in the law based on public policy rest solely within the prerogatives of the 
legislative branch of government, not the judicial.”). 
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of action.153  If the courts of Tennessee are without power to 
vitiate the clearly articulated public policy of the anti-heart balm 
legislation in Tennessee, how much more impotent ought the 
courts of other jurisdictions be to veto Tennessee law as it applies 
to Tennessee marriages. 
The jurisdictional question can be succinctly formulated as 
follows:  When the Mississippi public policy directly conflicts with 
the Tennessee public policy, which state’s public policy should 
be—and should be reasonably expected by the parties to be—
applicable to a Tennessee plaintiff aggrieved with a Florida 
defendant over the breakdown of a Tennessee marriage?  Though 
the Mississippi judges might fancy themselves as necessary 
outliers in the protection against the interference with marriage, 
the dictates of state sovereignty and due process block 
Mississippi’s crusade at the Tennessee state line. 
In sum, Mississippi’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over 
the parties is facially unreasonable and violates U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent.  By asserting personal jurisdiction and 
entertaining this out-of-state dispute, Mississippi imposes the 
tort of alienation of affection upon Tennessee and Florida, which 
long ago expressly rejected the tort.154  Should Mississippi be 
permitted to police the region and impose its public policy on 
other states, the doctrine of state sovereignty will be corrupted. 
Mississippi’s actions offend the courts and state legislatures of 
Tennessee and Florida, and invite similar wrongs against other 
states in future cases. 
2. Mississippi Lacks Jurisdiction to Hear Miller’s Case
Mississippi’s claim of jurisdiction over Anna Cladakis is a
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, as the parties have no meaningful connection to or 
contacts with Mississippi. 
Burger King v. Rudzewicz requires that the defendant have 
minimum contacts with the forum in order for the state to assert 
personal jurisdiction.155  “Minimum contacts” may arise from the 
defendant purposefully availing herself to the forum state156 or 
153 See Bailey v. Faulkner, 940 So. 2d 247, 250, 253 (Ala. 2006). 
154 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292. 
155 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985). 
156 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
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from foreseeability of the lawsuit.157  Even if minimum contacts 
exist, the assertion of personal jurisdiction may not be so 
unreasonable or unfair as to violate Due Process.158  Here, the 
Dalys lack any meaningful connection with Mississippi.  Cladakis 
did not purposely avail herself to the jurisdiction of 
Mississippi,159 nor, presumably, did she believe a lawsuit in 
Mississippi was foreseeable.  Even if Cladakis did have minimum 
contacts with Mississippi, it would be grossly unreasonable and 
unfair for Mississippi to assert personal jurisdiction over her. 
The tort of alienation of affection requires proof that a 
previously solid marriage broke down to the point where it was 
terminated due to the acts of another.160  The real focus of this 
tort is on the breakdown of the marriage, not on the commission 
of the sexual acts which contributed to the breakdown of the 
marriage.161  At the time of Daly’s and Cladakis’ alleged venture 
into Tunica, the Dalys were already separated;162 they did not 
have a solid marriage.  The actual “harm” was the termination of 
the marriage, which occurred in Tennessee.163  Only a tiny 
portion of the acts which could sustain the tort of alienation of 
affections occurred in Mississippi; no cause of action arose there. 
The dissolution of Miller’s marriage to Daly occurred entirely 
157 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292. 
158 See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113–14 
(1987). 
159 The Mississippi Court of Appeals held that Cladakis did, in fact, avail herself 
to the jurisdiction of Mississippi by engaging in sexual activity in that state. Miller 
v. Provident Advert. & Mktg., Inc., 155 So. 3d 181, 193 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014). For
mere public policy reasons, this is a far-reaching conclusion. Mississippi cannot
possibly argue that every individual who has had sex in that state has availed
themselves to the laws of Mississippi.
160 See Cotter, supra note 36. 
161 The heart balm action of criminal conversation, on the other hand, arises 
from extramarital sexual acts. It does not require showing of a breakdown in the 
marriage. However, Mississippi abolished this tort. Saunders v. Alford, 607 So. 2d 
1214, 1219 (Miss. 1992) (In abolishing the tort of criminal conversation, the court 
held, “[f]or the several reasons enumerated above we conclude that the tort of 
criminal conversation has outlived its usefulness.”). 
162 Steve DelVecchio, John Daly’s Ex-Wife Suing His Fiancee For Home-
Wrecking, LARRY BROWN SPORTS (Feb. 11, 2015), http://larrybrownsports.com/golf/jo 
hn-dalys-ex-wife-suing-his-fiancee-for-home-wrecking/254909. 
163 Cladakis could also argue that Florida has a better case for exercising 
jurisdiction over the case because she is a resident of that state; however, Florida 
abolished the tort of alienation of affection in 1945. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 771.01 (West, 
Westlaw through 2017 1st Reg. Sess. of the 25th Leg.). This fact makes Mississippi’s 
exercise of jurisdiction all the more unreasonable. 
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within the state of Tennessee—the only state with authority to 
dissolve that union.  Arguably, Miller’s allegations of adultery, if 
proven, between Daly and Cladakis while parked within the 
state of Mississippi would support a claim for damages under the 
tort of criminal conversation were it not for the fact that the 
Mississippi Supreme Court had previously repudiated that 
tort.164  Asserting jurisdiction in this case circumvents Supreme 
Court precedent and violates Cladakis’ and Daly’s due process 
rights. 
3. Mississippi’s Assertion of Jurisdiction Creates
Inconsistencies Within Tennessee
In Windsor, the Supreme Court explained that “[m]arriage
laws may vary from State to State, but they are consistent within 
each State.”165  Mississippi is creating inconsistencies in 
Tennessee marriages, despite the fact that Tennessee has 
expressly stated its public policy regarding alienation of affection 
and other heart balm actions.166  In doing so, Mississippi has 
“diminish[ed] the stability and predictability of basic personal 
relations the State has found it proper to acknowledge and 
protect.”167  For example, had Mr. Daly and Ms. Cladakis stopped 
at a rest stop on the Tennessee side of the Tennessee-Mississippi 
border rather than continuing on to Tunica, there would have 
been no cause of action.  Mississippi’s actions thus have created 
an “unequal . . . subset of [Tennessee] sanctioned marriages.”168 
164 Saunders, 607 So. 2d at 1219. 
165 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2681 (2013). In Windsor, a 
surviving spouse of a same-sex, married couple was denied federal tax benefits 
available to heterosexual, married couples. Id. at 2683. The Supreme Court found 
the federal statute unconstitutional on the basis that this same-sex married couple 
was treated differently than other married couples, in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause. Id. at 2695. Even though Windsor deals with a federal statute, 
much of the Court’s analysis is applicable to the case at hand. The Court reiterated 
the fact that domestic relations are historically within the province of state law. It 
also noted that federal law may supersede state law when that law is violative of the 
Constitution. Id. at 2695–96; see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 
(2015). 
166 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-701 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st Reg. 
Sess.). 
167 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694. 
168 Id. at 2681. 
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4. Mississippi’s Actions Will Inflict Financial Harm on
Tennessee
The Supreme Court held in Windsor that the federal Defense
of Marriage Act was inappropriate as it would levy financial 
harm against families.169  It is even more inappropriate for 
another state—Mississippi—to levy financial harm against 
residents of Tennessee and Florida.  Cladakis’ defense of Miller’s 
alienation of affections law suit generated substantial legal fees. 
The trial court had awarded Cladakis $78,307.22 in legal fees 
finding that Miller’s lawsuit was groundless;170 however, this 
award was reversed by the Court of Appeals.171  In addition, the 
court took judicial notice of the “not great” distance between 
Mississippi and Florida, thereby minimizing the cost to Cladakis 
to defend a lawsuit in Mississippi.172  Neither travel costs nor 
attorneys’ fees, however, are the true cost of this alienation of 
affections lawsuit.  Nor are the compensatory and exorbitant 
punitive damages awarded to the successful plaintiff.173  The true 
cost emerges as “[a]dversarial pressures and competitive 
economic impulses inevitably work to impair significantly, if not 
frustrate completely, the attainment of postdivorce harmony.”174 
5. Most Shockingly, Mississippi’s Law Creates a National Law
of Domestic Relations, in Direct Violation of Supreme Court
Precedent
“[T]here is no federal law of domestic relations.”175  If there is
no federal law of domestic relations, there should be no 
Mississippi law of domestic relations that extends beyond its 
borders.  Mississippi is attempting to make itself national law for 
alienation of affection claims.176  This paternalistic approach 
violates state sovereignty. 
169 Id. at 2695. 
170  Miller v. Provident Adver. & Mktg., Inc., 155 So. 3d 181, 187 (Miss. Ct. App. 
2014), cert denied, 135 S. Ct. 2862 (2015). 
171 Id. at 197. 
172 Id. at 194. 
173 Alice Gomstyn & Lee Ferran, Wife’s $9M Message to Mistresses: ‘Lay Off,’ 
ABC NEWS (Mar. 23, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Business/wife-wins-million-
husbands-alleged-mistress-story?id=10177637. 
174 Davidson, supra note 94, at 660. 
175 De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956). 
176 See Miller, 155 So. 3d at 194 (“The Legislature, in modifying our state’s long-
arm statute in 1980, expressed the public policy of the state to provide a forum for 
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Mississippi asserts that because Tennessee has explicitly 
repealed alienation of affection claims, it has a duty to offer this 
tort action to all who seek it.177  Obligations in marriage are not 
universal; states define marriage obligations for themselves.  The 
federal government has refused to redefine the marriage 
relationships that states have created.178  Tennessee defined and 
created the relationship between the Dalys.  Mississippi, then, is 
wrong to insert itself into the Dalys’ marriage.  Mississippi may 
not redefine the Dalys’ obligations—whether they be moral, 
financial, or legal—with respect to the relationship that 
Tennessee created.  Allowing Mississippi to create a national law 
for alienation of affection will only serve to further water down 
state sovereignty in the realm of domestic relations and tort law. 
B. North Carolina’s Long-Arm Just Got Shorter
Alienation of affections has enjoyed a prominent and
lucrative run in North Carolina, prominent in the frequency of 
cases filed179 and lucrative for the plaintiffs as million dollar 
verdicts are not uncommon.180  As in Mississippi, the North 
Carolina long-arm statute authorizes personal jurisdiction over a 
nonresident defendant whose actions constitute minimum 
contacts with the state.181  Whether those contacts comprise 
phone calls,182 emails,183 or sexual encounters,184 the Supreme  
nonresidents to pursue compensation for torts committed in whole or in part in this 
state.”). 
177 Id. 
178 See infra Part V.A. 
179 Rothrock v. Cooke, No. 14CVS870, 2014 WL 2973066, at *2 (N.C. Super. Ct. 
June 11, 2014) (noting that North Carolina courts routinely hear cases pertaining to 
alienation of affections). It is estimated that over 200 alienation of affections cases 
are filed in North Carolina each year. Infidelity & Alienation of Affection, ROSEN L. 
FIRM, www.rosen.com/divorce/divorcearticles/alienation-of-affection-and-criminal-
conversation (last visited June 25, 2017). 
180 See Gomstyn & Ferran, supra note 173. 
181 Cooper v. Shealy, 537 S.E.2d 854, 857 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (“[T]he North 
Carolina long-arm statute authorizes personal jurisdiction since the plaintiff’s injury 
allegedly occurred within North Carolina and was allegedly caused by the 
defendant’s solicitation of plaintiff’s husband’s love and affection by telephoning 
plaintiff’s home in North Carolina.”). 
182 Id. 
183 Crockett v. Prantner, No. COA11-1565, 2012 WL 4076463, at *7 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2012). 
184 Jones v. Skelley, 673 S.E.2d 385, 393 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009). 
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Court of North Carolina has consistently recognized that “North 
Carolina has a strong interest in protecting its citizens from local 
injury caused by the tortious conduct of [nonresidents].”185 
Within North Carolina, alienation of affections is not without 
limitations.  In 2003, the Court of Appeals held that contacts by a 
nonresident defendant with North Carolina were insufficient to 
establish personal jurisdiction.186  That court noted that the 
Tennessee plaintiff’s decision to sue the California defendant for 
alienation of affections in North Carolina “smacks of forum-
shopping.”187  However, the tort remains despite attempts to 
abolish this common law cause of action whether stemming from 
the North Carolina Court of Appeals188 or the General 
Assembly.189 
Completely sidestepping the myriad of public policy 
arguments that have underscored the near universal demise of 
the heart balm torts, a lower court judge in North Carolina 
recently penned a novel attack on the validity of alienation of 
affections.  In Rothrock v. Cooke,190 Superior Court Judge John O. 
Craig III held that both alienation of affections and criminal 
conversation are unconstitutional both facially and as applied to 
the facts as due process violations of the liberty and privacy 
interests guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.  This attack 
by a North Carolina lower court may not ultimately announce 
the death of alienation of affections in North Carolina.  But for 
now, Mississippi stands alone in its unjustifiable love affair with 
alienation of affections. 
185 Cooper, 537 S.E.2d at 858. 
186 Eluhu v. Rosenhaus, 583 S.E.2d 707, 712 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003). 
187 Id. at 711. 
188 See Cannon v. Miller, 322 S.E.2d 780, 784 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984), vacated, 327 
S.E.2d 888 (N.C. 1985) (The Court of Appeals’ concluded that there was no “legal or 
logical basis” for alienations of affections was overturned by the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina). 
189 See Sherry Honeycutt Everett, The Law of Alienation of Affections After 
McCutchen v. McCutchen: In North Carolina, Breaking Up Just Got Harder To Do, 
85 N.C. L. REV. 1761, 1767–68 (2007). 
190 Rothrock v. Cooke, No. 14CVS870, 2014 WL 2973066, at *1 (N.C. Super. Ct. 
June 11, 2014). 
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V. FAMILY LAW POLICY IS—AND SHOULD BE—THE CREATION OF
STATE LAW 
States have the exclusive right and power to regulate 
domestic relations.  “By history and tradition the definition and 
regulation of marriage has been treated as being within the 
authority and realm of the separate States.”191  This is for good 
reason—states have a fundamental interest in regulating family 
law due to its importance to society.  Marriage has traditionally 
been the basis of the family unit where “we inculcate and pass 
down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural.”192  
Marriage thus has been understood not merely as being “a 
routine classification for purposes of certain statutory 
benefits,”193 but rather an intrinsic human right that is “older 
than the Bill of Rights.”194  The power to regulate marriage rests 
with the state such that federal courts—absent a showing of 
diversity or federal question jurisdiction—lack authority to try 
family law cases.195  An action by an ex-spouse seeking damages 
against the person she holds responsible for the breakdown of her 
marriage goes to the very heart of a state’s public policy 
regarding the regulation of marriage and should be decided by 
state courts.196 
191 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2680 (2013); see also Sosna v. 
Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) (noting that the power to regulate domestic relations 
has “long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States”). 
192 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503–04 (1977) (“[T]he 
institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.”). 
193 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693. 
194 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
195 This is known as the “domestic relations exception.” Although federal courts 
are not prohibited from hearing cases “involving the issuance of a divorce, alimony, 
or child custody decree,” there is a presumption against them doing so. Ankenbrandt 
v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 704 (1992). See Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582 (1858) for
an overview of the domestic relations exception. There, a federal court was asked to
hear a tort case involving ex-spouses. Id. at 584. The non-moving party attempted to
invoke the domestic relations exception, which they argued prohibited the federal
court from hearing a family law case. Id. at 588. The Barber court disagreed,
reasoning that federal diversity jurisdiction gave the court authority to hear the
case. Id. at 592. There may be some erosion occurring with respect to the adherence
to the domestic relations exception to the jurisdiction of federal courts in post-
divorce tort actions. See, e.g., Jones v. Swanson, 341 F.3d 723 (8th Cir. 2003).
196  Cotter, supra note 36 (citing Andrews v. Patterson, 585 F. Supp. 553 
(M.D.N.C. 1984)). 
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Tennessee’s domestic relations statute is contained in 
Chapter 36 of the Tennessee Code Annotated.  Tennessee 
regulates who may marry, the process of applying for a marriage 
license, who may officiate the wedding, the obligations arising 
from marriage, as well as the divorce process.197  Remedies within 
marriage are another subset of categories that states may define. 
Conversely, the United States Code deals with marriage and 
divorce for survivorship, tax, and insurance purposes.198  Of 
course, there is no federal process for marriage or divorce, 
because “there is no federal law of domestic relations.”199 
A. The Constitutional Exception
A state’s interest in the institution of marriage, while
fundamental,200 is not final.201  Rights or remedies attendant to 
marriage within one state may be extended to residents of 
another state whose laws circumscribe marriage rights and 
remedies broadly.  In fact, the legal quest for the recognition of 
more permissive marriage laws co-opted from another may result 
in a constitutional challenge to the more narrowly framed rights 
and remedies of the sister state.  The right to marry is protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment;202 so federal law may supersede  
state law when it violates the Constitution.203  Such has been the 
recent history of state laws restricting marriage204 and adoption
to heterosexual couples.205 
197 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-101 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st Reg. 
Sess.) (providing an overview of who may marry in Tennessee); id. § 36-3-301 
(Westlaw) (prescribing who may officiate a wedding); and id. § 36-4-101 (Westlaw) 
(outlining Tennessee’s divorce procedures). 
198 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 8345 (2012) (prescribing the payment of benefits to 
federal employees and their spouses); 42 U.S.C. § 416 (2012) (defining “marriage,” 
“divorce,” “wife,” and “husband” for social welfare purposes). 
199 De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956). 
200 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 381 (1978). 
201 See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015); United 
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7, 
11–12 (1967). 
202 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (“The absence of dispute 
reflected this Court's historical recognition that freedom of personal choice in 
matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.” (citing Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978))). 
203 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695–96; see also Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604–05 
(“[T]he right to marry is a fundamental right in the liberty of the person, and under 
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment 
couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. The Court 
now holds that same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry.”); 
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However, federal law does not provide answers to conflicts 
between states over rights and remedies which lack 
Constitutional significance.  If the Constitution itself contains no 
basis for denying Tennessee the authority to repudiate the tort of 
alienation of affections, how can the Courts of Mississippi wield 
such power over Tennessee?  Left unchecked, the public policy of 
Mississippi through its long-arm statute’s inappropriate embrace 
of nonresidents could be imposed on residents of all fifty states. 
B. Uniform Laws:  The Exception Proves the Rule
In rare cases, the individual sovereignty of states in matters
of family law gives way to an overarching need for uniformity 
among the states.  Some aspects of family law require uniformity 
across states because there is a need for consistency among the 
states in order to make rulings or jurisdictional decisions 
feasible.  The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”) was drafted in 1997 and has since 
been adopted in 49 of the 50 states.  Massachusetts is the only 
state that has not adopted the Act.206  The stated purposes of the 
Act was to revise the child custody jurisdictional laws, in light of 
federal enactments and years of inconsistent rulings, to clarify 
jurisdictional questions, and to provide a uniform procedure of 
interstate custody enforcement.207 
Similarly, the Uniform Parentage Act is federal legislation 
that helps establish guidelines for states in establishing 
paternity of children born to unmarried parents.208  This Act was 
Loving, 388 U.S. at 7, 12 (striking down Virginia’s ban on interracial marriage 
because the ban violated the couple’s Due Process rights).  
204 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604–05. 
205 See V.L. v. E.L., 136 S. Ct. 1017, 1019 (2016). In that case, the Alabama 
Supreme Court refused to recognize a Georgia adoption and subsequent divorce 
decree, where the parents were a homosexual couple. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court 
reversed Alabama’s ruling, holding that Georgia had subject matter jurisdiction to 
issue the divorce decree and parenting plan. Id. at 1022. Alabama had to abide by its 
full faith and credit obligation. Id. 
206 See Legislative Fact Sheet - Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, 
UNIF. LAW COMM'N (1997) http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx? 
title=Child%20Custody%20Jurisdiction%20and%20Enforcement%20Act. 
207 Prefatory Note: Univ. Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, NAT’L 
CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAW (1997), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared 
/docs/child_custody_jurisdiction/uccjea_final_97.pdf. 
208 Prefatory Note: Uniform Parentage Act, NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. 
STATE LAW (2002), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/parentage/upa_final 
_2002.pdf. 
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originally drafted in 1973, modernized in 2000, and then 
amended in 2002.209  So far it has only been enacted in 11 
states,210 but has been endorsed by numerous ABA Sections.211  
This is another example of an area of family law that is better 
served by uniformity, because paternity issues could be ongoing 
and could be greatly affected by people moving across state lines. 
Both the UCCJEA and the Uniform Parentage Act are Acts put 
forth by the federal government to regulate family law, but the 
federal government has still left implementation to the states, 
thus reinforcing state autonomy. 
While Federal IV-D Regulations require a uniform 
application of child support guidelines throughout any given 
state, the states are still free to determine their own provisions of 
the guidelines on how to calculate support.212  This is just another 
example of the federal government leaving most regulation of 
families to the states, so that the states can further their 
individual public policies and not the public policies of the federal 
government. 
To contrast, the Uniform Commercial Code regulates 
business transactions because many business transactions take 
place across numerous state lines and, therefore, uniformity is 
essential.213  Businesses must have standardized rules, so that 
they are better able to determine how to interact with each other 
to make sales and contracts across the nation.  But families are 
not usually stretched across state borders in this manner, nor are 
they dealing with one another at an arm’s length, and therefore, 
state regulation is generally preferable. 
The need for uniformity in heart balm torts, like most family 
law actions, has not risen to the level of these other unique Acts. 
Heart balm torts relate to an incident frozen in time, and are 
never going to be an ongoing action, unlike the actions under the 
jurisdiction of the UCCJEA and the Uniform Parentage Act.  So 
far, these torts have been left to the states, and many states have 
deemed it necessary to abolish or at least minimize these actions. 
209 Id. 
210 Alabama, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
Texas, Utah, Washington, Wyoming have enacted the Uniform Parentage Act. 
211 Legislative Fact Sheet - Parentage Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N (2002), http://www 
.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Parentage%20Act. 
212 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(2) (2012) (amended 1997). 
213 U.C.C. § 1-103(a) (AM. LAW. INST. & NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. 
STATE LAWS 2016). 
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If state legislatures and state courts decide that their state no 
longer needs these actions or they do not wish to expand the 
torts, this is rightfully within their power.  The states know what 
works for them and what policies they wish to cultivate. 
C. The Unnecessary Call for the Abolishment of Heart Balm
Actions
As a resident of Tennessee, a state whose well-considered
public policy against alienation of affections is legally sound, the 
author could join the prolific scholarship calling for the uniform 
abolition of heart balm laws.214  Yet this article stops short of that 
battle cry, considering it to be an unnecessary infringement upon 
the sovereignty of states.  Nor does it join the pro-marriage 
activists or the feminist scholars who, for very different policy 
reasons find favor with the amatory torts.215  States are not 
obligated to legislate equally, but rather are free to legislate 
uniquely.  If the policy makers in the state of Mississippi choose 
to cling to the classic paradigms expressed by Prosser, namely 
that alienation of affections statutes “give increased protection to 
family interests and the sanctity of the home,” so be it.216  But no 
long-arm statute should ever be long enough to force 
Mississippi’s public policy upon the nonresidents of Mississippi, 
whose home states have jettisoned alienation of affections as a 
harmful cause of action which instead “diminish[es] human 
dignity, demeans the participants, inflicts pain upon the innocent 
and does not prevent human misconduct.”217 
214 See Crissman, supra note 125, at 518 (arguing that South Dakota should 
abolish alienation of affections); see also Kay Kavanagh, Note, Alienation of 
Affections and Criminal Conversation: Unholy Marriage in Need of Annulment, 23 
ARIZ. L. REV. 323, 340 (1981); Cary & Scudder, supra note 127, at 26 (“North 
Carolina should take the next step in its journey by abolishing criminal conversation 
and alienation of affection because they are antiquated, do not protect marriage or 
deter adultery, and in fact defeat forgiveness, thereby prolonging the healing process 
after infidelity.”); Heard, supra note 54, at 313 (“Mississippi should join the majority 
of states in the nation that have already legislatively or judicially abolished the 
action”); Christopher Joseph Whitesell, Loss of Consortium and Intentional Infliction 
of Emotional Distress: Alternative Theories to Alienation of Affections, 67 IOWA L. 
REV. 859, 860 (1982). 
215 Nehal A. Patel, Note, The State’s Perpetual Protection of Adultery, 2003 WIS. 
L. REV. 1013, 1037–38; see also McCarty, supra note 50 at 119–20.
216 KEETON ET. AL., supra note 60, § 124.
217 Dupuis v. Hand, 814 S.W.2d 340, 346 (Tenn. 1991). 
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The author’s primary critique of Mississippi’s alienation of 
affections statute stems from the Mississippi court’s 
inappropriate extension of its domestic relations policy outside of 
the state of Mississippi such that Mississippi effectively vetoes 
the public policy of sister states.  Secondly, the author criticizes 
the sloppy application of the tort of alienation of affections to the 
Daly facts.  While the alleged facts in Daly, if proven, might 
sustain an action for criminal conversation, such facts fail to 
establish alienation of affections.  Therefore, it is impermissible 
for the courts of Mississippi, having abolished criminal 
conversation, to nevertheless allow an action to proceed by 
squeezing it into the remaining tort of alienation of affections.218  
Mississippi is not its neighbor’s keeper, with respect to morality 
torts or otherwise.  If the legislators of Mississippi, elected by the 
people of Mississippi, wish to provide redress to the residents of 
Mississippi for a morality tort, Mississippi should be 
applauded.219  But the tort required to fit the Daly facts would 
resemble criminal conversation, not the alienation of affections 
statute as currently enacted in Mississippi. 
One commentator has suggested an interesting corollary 
between the rise of no fault divorce and the rise of domestic tort 
actions, namely, that “no fault divorce has deprived some spouses 
of the opportunity to give the judge evidence of the other spouse’s 
marital sins.”220  The anger and frustration that once were 
channeled into the fault aspects of a divorce action may now lead 
to an independent lawsuit by one spouse against the other or, in 
the case of heart balm torts, by one spouse against the alienator. 
If Mississippi wishes to cultivate post-divorce anger and 
218 Bailey v. Faulkner, an Alabama case, stands for the proposition that in states 
that have barred alienation of affection, a party cannot backdoor a claim via a 
different cause of action. 940 So. 2d 247, 253 (Ala. 2006). It follows, then, that if 
courts in Tennessee lack the power to offer alienation of affection as a cause of action 
to Tennessee residents, Mississippi should likewise lack that power. Further, 
Mississippi has barred the tort of criminal conversation, but is essentially allowing 
Sherrie Miller to allege it through the tort of alienation of affection. 
219 See William R. Corbett, A Somewhat Modest Proposal to Prevent Adultery 
and Save Families: Two Old Torts Looking for a New Career, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 98 
(2001); cf. Heard, supra note 54, at 334 (“[l]ike other supporters of abolition, 
[Mississippi Supreme Court] Justice Dickinson found the current rationale 
underlying the tort to be a legal fiction – stating several times that the tort does not, 
in fact, preserve or stabilize a marital union. . . . [Instead], alienation actions have 
‘outlived any relevance or usefulness they may have once possessed . . . .’ ”). 
220 See Robert G. Spector, All in the Family—Tort Litigation Comes of Age, 28 
FAM. L. Q. 393 (1994). 
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frustration by providing a tort and a forum for its residents, no 
other state has reason to object.  However, Mississippi’s self-
perceived role as the haven for the wounded hearts of 
nonresidents violates due process. 
CONCLUSION 
Arguably, the heart balm torts have outlived their relevance 
in a society where marriage is no longer a necessary imprimatur 
for intimate relations,221 and where broken hearts and failed 
marriages are the statistical norm.222  A state’s resolute rejection 
of the heart balm torts in principle as well as applied to modern 
domestic relations mores need be checked neither by 
Constitutional protections of marriage nor by the need for 
uniformity among sister states.  Therefore, one state need not 
and must not transport its domestic relations public policy across 
state lines.  Mississippi’s expansive jurisdictional embrace of 
nonresidents, John Daly and Anna Cladakis, based upon their 
alleged temporary embrace of each other, violates Anna Cladakis’ 
due process rights while providing a forum for Daly’s 
opportunistic ex-wife to pursue publicity and monetary damages 
by vitiating the clear public policy of her home state of 
Tennessee. 
221 One author has proposed a modification of the amatory torts noting that 
“America is ready for a tort that protects against outside interference with all 
intimate adult relationships.” See Deans, supra note 37, at 383. 
222 “Of college-educated people who married in the early 2000s, only about 11 
percent divorced by their seventh anniversary, the last year for which data is 
available. Among people without college degrees, 17 percent were 
divorced . . . Overall, the marriage trends resemble those in many other areas of 
American life. For people on the wealthier side of the class divide, life is better than 
it used to be in many ways. For people on the other side, the situation is much more 
complicated.” Claire Cain Miller, The Divorce Surge is Over, but the Myth Lives on, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/upshot/the-divorce-
surge-is-over-but-the-myth-lives-on.html. 
